Indonesia in the 1950s. Nation, modernity and the post-colonial state by Schulte Nordholt, H.G.C.
HENK SCHULTE NORDHOLT
Indonesia in the 1950s
Nation, modernity, and the post-colonial state
My dream was about a clean and tidy country with beautiful trains. 
A country where everybody would be happy.1
Perspective, mobility, rootedness
Since Soeharto’s New Order, the 1950s have been represented in Indonesian 
historiography as ‘the road to disaster’, when the country was torn apart by 
regional rebellions and rising political tensions between right and left, which 
were mainly attributed to the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian 
Communist Party).2 This image is now being challenged and much more work 
needs to be done to investigate the relatively unknown 1950s in more detail.
Usually, the 1950s have been viewed in comparison with other eras – in a 
negative sense as a time of stagnation and a prelude to chaos and in contrast 
to order and development during the New Order, or, alternatively, in a posi-
tive sense as a period of democracy, as opposed to New Order authoritarian-
ism, and as the aborted pre-history of post-1998 decentralization. However, 
instead of using the 1950s as a kind of background to other periods, it is more 
interesting to assess this decade on its own terms and explore its particular 
dynamics and complexities.3 In this essay I want to focus on discussions 
1 Suwarno, a former freedom fighter, who was 20 years old in 1949, in an interview with de 
Volkskrant, 21-12-2009.
2 I would like to thank the participants of the conference Kemerdekaan dan Perubahan Jati 
Diri/Post-colonial Indonesian Identity, Yogyakarta, 14-15 January 2010, and Gerry van Klinken, 
Jennifer Lindsay, Remco Raben, Heather Sutherland and Jean Gelman Taylor for helpful remarks 
and stimulating questions.
3 For a similar approach to the years immediately preceding World War I in Europe, see Blom 
2008. 
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about Indonesian national identity, which were primarily framed in cultural 
terms, and tentatively explore some historical trajectories.4
In his recent manifesto on cultural mobility, Stephen Greenblatt (2010) 
drew attention to an interesting paradox. On the one hand we see practices of 
cultural mobility. Traders, priests, soldiers, migrant labourers, newspapers, 
novels, schools, objects, ideas, images, and sounds were all vehicles of mobil-
ity, and Southeast Asian history is to a large extent characterized by cultural 
mobility. Gradually, colonial regimes, and later on nation-states, accompa-
nied by academic institutions, handbooks and encyclopedias, produced tem-
porary illusions of sedentary, closed cultures, turning dynamic processes into 
static things. Both mobility and institutionalization reveal a paradox: culture 
consists on the one hand of mobility, interaction, adaptation and change, but 
on the other hand it represents a deeply felt longing for rootedness and stabil-
ity in order to create a sense of ‘at-homeness’ because of the threat posed by 
mobility. Although culture is mobile, it is often appreciated because it offers 
refuge from the outside world. 
Taking these ideas about mobility and rootedness into consideration, how 
should we evaluate the optimistic efforts to shape a new nation driven by 
modernity during the first half of the 1950s? And to what extent were these 
efforts gradually aborted by the encroachment of a neo-patrimonial state, 
which was dominated by a post-colonial middle class?
An optimistic desire for the future
In his recent history of the Indonesian nation, Taufik Abdullah (2009:183) de-
scribes Soekarno’s homecoming in Jakarta on 28 December 1949. While Jakar-
ta was, in Soekarno’s words flooded by ‘millions and millions of people’, the 
new president went to the former palace of the Dutch Governor-General, and 
by doing so the new nation took possession of the former colonial state. This 
was according to Taufik perhaps the greatest moment in his life as a national 
leader.5 But was it perhaps also the climax of the nation itself?
4 Two inspiring workshops, sponsored by the Australian Netherlands Research Collaboration 
and hosted by KITLV, focused on cultural politics in Indonesia between 1950-1965: Indonesia’s 
Cultural Traffic Abroad 1950-65, Leiden, 7-9 April 2009; Culture and the Nation, Arts in Indonesia 
1950-1965, Jakarta, 5-7 October 2009. For the rich results of these meetings, see Lindsay and Liem 
2011.
5 Taufik Abdullah 2009:200. Soekarno’s complex ideas about the nation and a national culture 
deserve a separate study which goes beyond the scope of this essay. He was a modern architect 
who literally designed the signs and symbols of the new nation, and mobilized the population 
to become Indonesians, but in doing so – and in propagating an ongoing revolution – he also 
exploited nativist ideas while his democratic credentials were minimal. 
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In 1950 nationalism was triumphant. According to Herbert Feith (1962:74), 
‘its power as a cohesive force binding the archipelago together was at its 
zenith’. That year had witnessed a remarkably easy transition from a federa-
tion of 16 states into a unitary republic. This process was not primarily forced 
from above because, according to Taufik Abdullah (2009:194), the real forces 
of unitarism were the local informal leaders whose political orientations had 
been largely shaped by the sense of being part of the national revolution.
The year 1950 also witnessed the launch of a new outward-looking 
national identity, expressing optimism and self-confidence, as echoed by the 
opening quotation of this article. Jennifer Lindsay (2011a:15) rightly remarks 
that in the early 1950s the Indonesian nation was primarily a cultural project. 
Moreover, she observes that ‘to be an Indonesian was to be modern’. National 
identity and modernity were therefore inextricably intertwined.
On 18 February 1950 a young poet, Asrul Sani (1928-2004), published with 
his friends a cultural manifesto entitled ‘Surat kepercayaan’ (Testimonial of 
beliefs) in ‘Gelanggang’, the literary section of the weekly magazine Siasat. On 
behalf of his literary colleagues, later known as Angkatan 45, or Generation of 
1945, Sani wrote: ‘We are the legitimate inheritors of the culture of the whole 
world, […] and we shall transmit this culture in our own way. We come 
from the ordinary people and for us the people are a mixture of everything 
from where a new and healthy world would be born.’ (Quoted in Taufik 
Abdullah 2009:200.) According to Taufik Abdullah, this manifesto made the 
boundaries and rootedness of culture irrelevant. Indonesian culture was no 
longer localized and materialized in ancient objects, because ‘Indonesianess 
(ke-Indonesia-an) does not rest in our brown skins and cheek bones but rather 
in the expression of our hearts and minds’.6 Indonesian culture should there-
fore be seen as a process of continuous creation. ‘Surat kepercayaan’ was not 
a clear-cut definition but a declaration about the future, a statement that the 
modern world is a source of inspiration, and that a new national culture is 
not passively inherited but actively created. Culture was seen as the process 
of creativity itself. But the authors of the manifesto considered politics to be 
other people’s business.
The making of a new national culture was very much seen in terms of 
mobility seeking inspiration from various parts of the world and moving 
to a better future, and in so doing emphasizing discontinuity with the past. 
Building a new future implied that the past had to be abandoned. However, 
the search for a national identity and efforts to define what a national culture 
should be, would remain an unfinished project in which mobility, open-
mindedness and an orientation towards the future collided with a desire for 
rootedness, essentialized identities and a focus on the past. The debate about 
6 As quoted by Taufik Abdullah 2009:202; see also Lindsay 2011a:10-1.
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Indonesia’s national culture therefore oscillated between an outwardly ori-
ented modernity and an inward-looking nativism.
New organizations such as Lekra (Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat, Institute 
of People’s Culture) and journals such as Mimbar Indonesia addressed ques-
tions about how to give cultural content to sovereignty and how to reconcile 
a deeply felt desire for progress and modernity with cultural artefacts and 
practices inherited from the colonial past. To some extent the pre-war dis-
cussion in Poedjangga Baroe about the indigenous roots of Indonesian culture 
and the search for a rooted authenticity versus a radical new internationally 
oriented culture was continued. In Mimbar Indonesia debates concentrated on 
questions about whether a culture should be rooted in the past or based on 
a forward-looking belief in modernity, expressed in terms such as newness 
(kabaharuan), progress (kemajuan), and dansa (dance) in contrast to tari (tradi-
tional dance) (Bogaerts 2011).
Questions were raised about the extent to which Indonesian culture was 
part of the Eastern world, how to connect cultural heritage with modern tech-
nology, and whether culture should be defined in terms of art or beschaving/
peradaban (civilization). A discussion about the distinction between culture in 
terms of kebudayaan batin versus beschaving/perabadan perceived as kebudayaan 
lahir reflected a European distinction between the German idea of Kultur and 
the French concept of civilisation.
Questions were raised and concepts were launched, but there was little 
consensus about answers and solutions. Instead of trying to define what 
national cultural identity was exactly, it is more helpful to identify briefly 
several elements that structured the debates on these issues.7 
It is important to realize that the new nation-state was still in search of a 
centre. With the benefit of hindsight it seems as if Jakarta had always been 
the centre of the nation, but this was actually the outcome of a process. 
Only gradually did Jakarta become the main platform where ideas about an 
Indonesian identity were expressed. For that reason old provincial Batavia 
had to be redesigned into a new future-oriented capital.8
In this emerging centre, ideas about an Indonesian identity had to be 
expressed in the new national language, which in 1950 was only spoken by 
a minority of the population, while Dutch was still dominant in intellectual 
circles.9 Mediated through primary and secondary education and new media 
such as radio, film, short stories and new forms of theatre, Bahasa Indonesia 
7 I refer here primarily to some of the themes discussed at the workshop in Jakarta in October 
2009 mentioned in note 4.
8 For an illuminating sketch of how Jakarta was redesigned into a modern capital, see Fakih 
2005.
9 According to Thee Kian Wie (personal communication, May 2009), until 1957 introductory 
courses in economics were taught in Dutch at the Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta.
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rapidly penetrated deeper into Indonesian society. The lively role played by a 
host of new organizations in civil society was also a new development.
An important aspect of what it meant to be Indonesian involved the 
display of a particular attitude reflecting ideas derived from the Indonesian 
Revolution and solidarity with the poor. The new nation was, to put it simply, 
pro rakyat. This attitude was for instance expressed in literature and paintings 
from the Akademi Seni Rupa in Yogyakarta (Knol, Raben and Zijlmans 2009). 
It was also expressed in a particular lifestyle that was urban-based and one 
that advocated modernity, and found its expression in dress, habits, and 
tastes. Research on this topic has hardly begun. 
The search for a new national culture was characterized by a fair degree of 
open-mindedness. New possibilities were explored and creativity was stimu-
lated, while a plurality of opinions was tolerated. New media also widened the 
international horizon as people were interested in developments abroad, based 
on the awareness that Indonesia was part of a larger world of new nations. 
Modernity had in this respect several sources of inspiration. Western Europe 
was replaced by the United States, but China displayed an alternative socialist 
model of modernity, while Egypt offered Islamic-oriented ideas of modernity 
(Lindsay 2011a; Liu 2006). Indonesia also gained international respect by orga-
nizing the Bandung Conference of Non-aligned Countries in 1955.
Dutch efforts to play a role in defining Indonesia’s cultural agenda 
failed. Exchange programmes financed by Sticusa (Stichting voor Culturele 
Samenwerking, Foundation for Cultural Cooperation) proved not very suc-
cessful (Dolk 2011). In Indonesia the magazine Oriëntatie (1947-1954) under 
the editorial leadership of Rob Nieuwenhuys was inspired by the mestizo 
trajectory of Latin America to realize a blend of Western (Dutch) and indig-
enous elements in the search for a new national culture. However, Indonesian 
intellectuals showed little interest in bridging the gap between East and West 
under Dutch editorial guidance (Veenkamp 1997).
Indonesia reaffirmed its newly won self-confidence by performing its cul-
tural identity abroad. Large delegations consisting of dance groups – mainly 
from Central Java and Bali, but also from Bandung, Padang, Medan and 
Makassar – performed traditional regional dances and new national songs. 
National export culture was dominated by a mix of post-colonial high culture 
from Central Java and Bali – but the background of the performers was less 
aristocratic – and efforts to present the new nation through national revolu-
tionary songs. In 1954 the first mission was sent to China, after which many 
other countries, especially in the communist/socialist sphere were visited 
(Lindsay 2011b). Meanwhile separate connections were established within 
the Muslim world with Pakistan and Egypt (Salim 2011), while Balinese intel-
lectuals visited India for the first time.
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An Indonesian cultural identity was by definition an unfinished project 
because ideas and ideals were projected into the future. Therefore national-
ism in the early 1950s was to a large extent an ongoing discourse about the 
future. Asked how the future looked like in 1956, when he was 18 years old, 
Ajip Rosidi answered: ‘Bright and shining (cemerlang)! And the future was 
overwhelming.’10 This optimism, not yet contaminated by mass murder, was 
also reflected in a particular genre of photos. Examples may be found in an 
article on Indonesia in National Geographic Magazine of September 1955. The 
text is a rather superficial travelogue, but photos do express the cheerful 
future-oriented optimism typical of the 1950s (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Optimism in the 1950s (Bowie 1956:360)
Although much of the talk about national cultural identity took place in Ja-
karta, it is fallacious to assume that discussions about the fate of the nation 
were restricted to the national level in Java, while regions were backward 
repositories of conservatism. Nationalism and regionalism did not exclude 
10 At the workshop in Leiden, April 2009.
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each other (Asnan et al. 2006; Velthoen 2003; Liddle 1970). Ruth McVey (1994) 
has argued that politicians at the national level showed a consciousness that 
they belonged together to a single nation. The same applied to politicians at 
the regional level. There was also no one-way traffic from the centre to the 
regions because regions stimulated the centre, and within regions the nation 
was given shape as well, alongside notions of the local. 
The quest for progress and modernity was very much alive in the regions. 
Medan is an interesting example of cultural dynamics at the regional level. 
The city became the capital of pulp fiction in the 1950s and from where 
American comic book heroes such as Flash Gordon, Rib Kirby and Tarzan 
reached an Indonesian audience. Medan maintained, moreover, connections 
with the Malay film industry in Penang and Singapore. At the same time, 
Medan-based writers such as Agam Wispi and Bakri Siregar contributed to 
literary debates in Jakarta. Seen from this perspective, Medan looked more 
cosmopolitan than Jakarta (Plomp 2011).
The willingness of regional leaders to participate in the nation was, how-
ever, conditional, because they were very much against the prospect of being 
dominated by Java/Jakarta (Asnan et al. 2006:117-9). And as much as regional 
rebellions were manifestations of local chauvinism, rebellions were also 
expressions of frustration about the course the Indonesian nation-state had 
taken. It was to a large extent due to the rhetoric of the army that regional 
rebels were depicted as separatists. Kahar Muzakkar’s famous retreat into 
the hutan (jungle) was indeed a manifestation against the evils of the city, but 
in the hutan he gave shape to his own version of modernity by establishing 
health care, mechanized agriculture and a university (Velthoen 2003:108).
Before moving to questions concerning state and class, let us dwell a little 
longer on the regional level in order to obtain a better idea of the actual actors 
involved. 
Back to Mojokuto: Nation-state and modernity
Clifford Geertz’s Religion of Java (1960) is a wonderful ethnography and offers 
telling snapshots of how the new nation and modernity were intertwined in 
the early 1950s. The energy of the revolution in the early 1950s was the driving 
force of nationalism. 
Supported by a new, if still weak sense of national identity, a new, but still uneasy 
sense of self-confidence, nationalism is thus becoming an important integrating 
factor in the society, most especially for the elite, for the educated youth and the 
urban masses. It is, in fact for some of the more engaged, a secular religion. (Geertz 
1960:370.)
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However, apart from Independence Day, most national celebrations such as 
National Anthem Day were regarded as a priyayi (administrative elite) affair 
and most people were ‘ashamed’ and ‘embarrassed’ to go to them. 
On National Anthem Day, a corps of Chinese students dressed in white uniforms 
marched briskly in the District Officer’s yard. There was an (obligatory) competition 
in the singing of the anthem (which, as it is in Indonesian, is not in everyone’s pow-
er) by the village officials of the eighteen village-clusters, and there were speeches by 
several town leaders and the District Officer. But very few people came to watch the 
proceedings, and those who did were, most likely, merely reminded of their preju-
dices against the commercially prosperous Chinese. (Geertz 1960:376.)
On the first of May communists-dominated organizations paraded with ban-
ners 
demanding the death of imperialism, the cessation of corruption, the cession of 
Western New Guinea to Indonesia, and so on. They end up at the town square, 
where a large rally is held under some huge pictures of Stalin, Lenin, Mao, and 
national Communist heroes and leaders (recently, the displaying of portraits of 
foreign leaders has been forbidden). Partly because […] the Communist party was 
supporting the Government, partly because the Government, afraid of violence, 
laid down rather strict rules about what could be said and done on May 1st and 
enforced them by the presence of a goodly number of well-armed policemen, the 
rallies and celebrations tended to be rather mild. (Geertz 1960:376-7.)
On their part, orthodox Muslims (santri) were unsuccessful in their attempt to 
establish a political holiday of their own on May 1, Hari Kabungan Nasional 
(Day of National Mourning), to ‘celebrate’ the failure of the Communist revolt 
against the Republic in Madiun in 1948 (Geertz 1960:377).
Even 17 August was celebrated for the most part by people represent-
ing modern nationalism ‒ the urban intelligentsia, making nationalism very 
much synonymous with modernity. 
There is a parade of school children complete with drum corps […] there is a flow-
er-arrangement contest for women, for which the prize is a set of dishes; there 
are various sports contests ‒ badminton, volley-ball, one-o-cat, soccer, for which 
trophies are awarded to the winning teams; there is a baby-show at which win-
ners are selected for health and beauty; there is a profusion of Indonesian national 
flags; there is a banquet and formal reception for town leaders of all groups at the 
District Office; and, at the climax, there is the President of the Republic’s speech 
broadcast from Djakarta and sent out over loudspeakers to crowds of people gath-
ered in the public square. (Geertz 1960:377.)
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According to Geertz, the degree of participation on 17 August was ‘surprisingly 
great’, displaying ‘the new forms of social and cultural integration proposed for 
Indonesian society by an urbanized and educated elite’. It was ‘an urban spon-
sored advertisement for a way of life which though still unclearly formulated is 
of increasing attractiveness to more and more Indonesians’ (Geertz 1960:378).
Observing Mojokuto in the early 1950s one may wonder about the extent 
to which Benedict Anderson’s classic distinction (1983) between ‘nation’ and 
‘state’ is artificial. For, in Mojokuto we see how the nation was to a large extent 
propagated by the state. And both nation and state were very much associated 
with modernity. Revolution and modernity, mediated through an urban elite 
and represented by the state ‒ that was what national culture was about. 
Concerns, disillusion and a sense of crisis
Just as the experience of modernity itself was often accompanied by a sense of 
loss and insecurity about the future, the early years of the Indonesian nation-
state were also characterized by a permanent sense of crisis, caused by politi-
cal instability and institutional weakness. Java’s countryside was plagued by 
endemic insecurity due to banditry and the state’s inability to maintain ‘law 
and order’.11 Yet Remco Raben reminds us, that, alongside the euphoria of 
independence, in the early 1950s there were also instances of repression by 
the state.12 Based on colonial regulations (the state of emergency or Staat van 
Oorlog en Beleg (SOB), and the so-called offence of the press or persdelict), 
many trade union leaders and journalists were imprisoned for political rea-
sons. Pressured by the United States and authorized by the Sukiman cabinet, 
a big razzia in August 1951 resulted in the arrest of 15,000 leftists, and by 
the end of that year 21,000 individuals were in prison. In 1952 the Wilopo 
cabinet released 14,000 of them, but that year also witnessed the 17 October 
Affair, which inaugurated General Nasution’s efforts to make the army an 
indispensable factor in the fragile nation-state.
The sense of crisis became more intense in the second half of the 1950s. 
An essay contest on the state of the nation organized by Soedjatmoko in 1957 
reflected a deep sense of pessimism among the 355 respondents: ‘The road is 
winding, the goal is unknown, I lose my way and drift’. ‘My sun no longer 
shines, my feet are wounded, and so is my soul.’ (Pauker 1958, cited by Liu 
2006.)
11 Robert Cribb (2010) argues in this context that the weak rule of law was also caused by the legal 
pluralism inherited from the colonial period which made the rule of national or adat law optional.
12 Presentation by Remco Raben at the Workshop on Colonial Fears in Leiden on 6 November 
2009. Raben is currently writing a book on Indonesia’s transition from the late colonial state to the 
early independence years.
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Initially there had been ample room for debate and disagreement within 
Lekra, while family relationships and social networks offered opportunities 
to overcome ideological differences, but gradually ideological contestation 
increased and groups of friends turned into opposing factions.
Whereas debates within Lekra concentrated on the nature of socialist or 
social realism and how to indigenize these concepts, an increasing number 
of leftist intellectuals turned away from Western influences as the Cold War 
gained ground. They were willing to give up a more open-minded brand of 
modernity in favour of new revolutionary models such as the one advertised 
by the People’s Republic of China. What made the Chinese model attractive 
was that it was supported by a strong state.13
If 1950 had been the zenith of nationalism, the general elections of 1955 
illustrated the success of electoral democracy because 90 per cent of the 
voters cast their votes in the absence of major irregularities. However, the 
outcome of the elections was inconclusive and the failure of the Konstituante 
(Constitutional Assembly) to deliver a new Constitution demonstrated how 
difficult it was to institutionalize democracy and citizenship (Nasution 1992).
The legitimacy of the nation-state was further undermined by corruption. 
In short stories and in his novel Korupsi, Pramoedya Ananta Toer expressed 
disillusion and bitterness because promises of a better future were not ful-
filled. In his short story ‘The mastermind’, Pramoedya (2000:215-31) sketches 
the career of Tuan Kariumun, who started as a debt collector, then became a 
civil servant under the Dutch, a deputy bureau chief under the Japanese, a 
hero of the revolution, then again bureau chief in Jakarta, chairman of various 
associations, Member of Parliament and the Konstituante. He was primarily 
the embodiment of opportunism and corruption. We will return to him later.
The sense of frustration expressed in Pramoedya’s work evolved into 
outright cynicism in Mochtar Lubis’s novel Sendja di Jakarta (1957). Against 
a background of poverty-stricken ordinary people, a group of well-to-do 
friends regularly meet and engage in ideological discussions which become 
shallow as opportunism and large-scale corruption dominate everyday life. 
In Sendja di Djakarta urban life is no longer the breeding ground of modernity 
but the epicentre of greediness, moral decay, and appalling poverty. In a 
cynical comment on ‘the atomic age’ – catchwords of modernity in the 1950s 
featuring in the very title of Adrian Vickers’s chapter (2005:113-41, especially 
127-8) on that decade – one of the characters in Sendja di Djakarta remarks: 
‘Has it occurred to you that we no longer live in the atomic age, but in an 
age of disbelief? Disbelief that is caused by a fundamental disillusion felt by 
mankind, because the war has not made an end to warfare, but resulted in 
an all encompassing sense of crisis and loss’ (Lubis 1957:54; my translation).
13 Liu 2006. See Day and Liem 2010, for an illuminating series of articles on cultural expression 
during the Cold War in Southeast Asia.
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The neo-patrimonial state and the post-colonial middle class
Taufik Abdullah (2009:251-9) identifies three Indonesias in the 1950s. The first 
is an Indonesia that had achieved independence and sovereignty. The second 
is a new nation-state on a trajectory towards democracy, press freedom, a new 
constitution, and emerging citizenship; an Indonesia with an expanding edu-
cational system, independent courts, absence of religious conflict, a commit-
ted parliament, and vertical mobility (Feith 1994). This Indonesia was, howev-
er, overtaken by a third Indonesia, characterized by the struggle for power. In 
this Indonesia, the state was no longer seen as an instrument to build a nation 
and to safeguard citizenship, but as a resource that fuelled neo-patrimonial 
networks. In this context, ‘politics became the commander’, which implied 
that relationships in the public domain were increasingly politicized and the 
major political parties established their own cultural organizations in order 
to compete with Lekra, which was increasingly dominated by the Indonesian 
Communist Party’s interests.
Despite the fact that the provisional Constitution of 1950 promised basic 
human rights, legal equality, freedom of movement, religion, conscience, 
Figure 2. 3½ centuries of Dutch occupation; 3½ years of Japanese occupation; 
17 August 1945; 17 August 1954 (Pemuda, No. 11, November 1954)
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thought, expression, assembly and association, the right to strike and demon-
strate, and provided, in short, the foundation for citizenship, and the fact that 
the Constitutional Assembly did draw up a charter of human rights in 1956, 
the constitutional process was nevertheless aborted by President Soekarno 
and army chief Nasution (Elson 2008:193).
We are all familiar with the debate between Harry Benda and Herbert 
Feith about the ‘decline of constitutional democracy’ in Indonesia during the 
1950s. Whereas Benda maintained that political developments in Indonesia 
should be seen in their own cultural terms because Western democratic 
institutions were not compatible with indigenous culture, Feith argued that 
it is reasonable to assume that processes of modernization and nation build-
ing should result in democracy. Looking back at this debate McVey (1994) 
concludes that both Benda and Feith based their case on cultural (indigenous 
versus Western) arguments, and that both ignored the role of the state as a 
decisive factor. Due to the weakness of the state, Indonesia was not able to 
frame its democracy in solid institutions.14
The state was weak because it had experienced a war and a revolution. It 
was also a post-colonial state, which implied that it was primarily designed 
to control and to extract, and not to support a nation and to guarantee citi-
zenship. As such Indonesians inherited a state with serious handicaps. There 
was, moreover, hardly a national economy to which the state could turn in 
order to increase its power.
The infrastructure had been neglected since the late 1920s and there were 
few means available for improvement because the Indonesian government 
had promised to re-pay a debt of 4.5 billion guilders to the Dutch govern-
ment (Lindblad 2008:179). While vital parts of the real economy of the former 
colonial state were still in Dutch hands, the Indonesian government aimed to 
control institutions with a high symbolic profile such as the central bank and 
national aviation (Lindblad 2008:211-8). 
One may even doubt whether Indonesia actually had a national econo-
my. Lindblad’s approach (2008) is in this respect perhaps too teleological. 
Howard Dick (2006) observes a split between the prosperous western part of 
the archipelago producing oil and rubber, and the eastern part whose main 
export was copra and which increasingly lagged behind. Politicians and 
bureaucrats tried to manage the economy by establishing a complex system 
of multiple exchange rates which stimulated smuggling and facilitated the 
emergence of shadow economies in which businessmen, military, politicians 
and bureaucrats colluded. So, instead of a national economy, we see a set of 
neo-patrimonial economies with many gateways to international business 
14 See the famous phrase by Ben Anderson that Indonesia’s national budget in 1950 was as big 
as that of Cornell University (Barker and Van Klinken 2009:19). 
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networks. Dick also argues that the increasingly dominant role of the army 
in the economy directly stimulated the successful growth of Singapore which 
absorbed a considerable amount of Indonesian-Chinese business capital.
After the mid-1950s the euphoria of the revolution started to wane and 
democracy was under threat, while citizenship was fragile as Eurasians and 
Chinese soon would learn. The Cold War created a new and hostile interna-
tional context which left Indonesia only a few allies. In this setting the lead-
ership of the Republic became more and more obsessed with the concept of 
national unity (Elson 2008:151).
This set the stage for Soekarno to advocate a return to the Constitution of 
1945. The authors of the 1945 Constitution were inspired by Fascist Italy, Nazi 
Germany and Imperial Japan and favoured an integralist state, which boiled 
down to a mixture of corporatism, colonial adat (customary) law, and Dutch 
interpretations of Javanese ideas about hierarchy and harmony. It gave prior-
ity to a collective identity, instead of protecting individual rights, and saw the 
nation-state in terms of a family under fatherly care. It gave priority to the 
state as it favoured the machtsstaat instead of the rechtsstaat (Bourchier 1997). 
An open-minded and future-oriented attitude was replaced by a closed and 
inward- and even backward-looking conceptualization of the nation, which 
was framed in conservative corporatism.
In his history of the idea of Indonesia, Elson admits that Indonesia lacked 
‘a set of stable institutions, able to mediate and negotiate different interests 
and arguments and create the conditions for their collective collaboration’, 
but he seems to lay the blame primarily on nationalist politicians for their 
failure to establish a clear and convincing idea of what Indonesia should be, 
which resulted in a ‘lack of a clear sense of purpose’ (Elson 2008:160). Instead 
of focusing on the moral qualities of politicians, I agree with McVey that it 
might be more helpful from an analytical point of view to look at the institu-
tional constraints of the state. However, I propose to add another question: 
who actually ‘inhabited’ the Indonesian state in the early 1950s? Perhaps the 
answer can tell us more about the specific post-colonial nature of the state, 
which may have further marginalized the open-minded and future-oriented 
nationalism that characterized the early years of the new nation-state.
In his History of modern Indonesia, Vickers (2005:115-6) seems to provide 
a clear answer to my question: ‘At the core of the citizenship of Indonesia 
was the new class that had emerged during the Dutch period […]. The new 
class was the nationalist class that had received Western education and had 
rejected government service in favor of professional activities.’ They took 
over politics and invaded the bureaucracy, and ‘disseminated through the 
state and political parties the desire for the modern into the rest of Indonesian 
society and in so doing they gave meaning to the nation’. This looks very 
similar to what Geertz observed in Mojokuto, but the nature of the suppos-
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edly new nationalist ‘class’ needs further qualification.
Since the late 1920s the Indonesian bureaucracy had grown from 115,000 
to well over 400,000 officials by the early 1950s. Especially during the revolu-
tion both the Dutch-controlled federal states and the Republic had employed 
thousands of new government employees (Feith 1962:83; Evers 1987). 
Consequently, in 1950 Indonesia inherited 180,000 civil servants from the 
federal states, and 240,000 from the Republic.15 At first sight it looks as if this 
massive influx of new employees indeed constituted a new ‘class’ of nation-
alists. However, a closer look reveals that this picture is actually far more 
complicated. At least four comments need to be made here.
First, despite the massive expansion of the administrative apparatus and 
the influx of large groups of nationalists, more than 100,000 senior officials, 
who had been trained by the Dutch, moved upwards and occupied the stra-
tegic top echelon of the national bureaucracy. Consequently, Indonesia’s 
colonial legacy consisted in a large part of a coherent and conservative 
bureaucratic elite concentrated in the Ministry of Interior. Their main inter-
est was to maintain the stability of the state, and to a much lesser extent the 
mobilization of the nation.
Second, another aspect of the colonial inheritance consisted of laws, regu-
lations, procedures, and a set of administrative practices and attitudes, which 
included amongst others distrust towards society, a centralist and patron-
izing administrative approach, giving priority to unity and the interests of 
the state. And this administrative habitus also affected the new generation 
of bureaucrats. Gerald Maryanov (1959:83-4) rightly remarks that patterns 
of administrative behaviour remained firmly rooted in Dutch traditional 
procedures:
Indonesianization meant more the replacement of Dutch officials with Indonesian 
citizens rather than any major break with bureaucratic form or pattern. [...] The 
Dutch forms could not be removed bodily for no substitutes were available, and 
there was no time for experimentation even if such had been desired.
So, if we want to identify how colonial elements moved into the new nation-
state it is crucial to concentrate in detail on the transfers that took place be-
tween the late colonial state and the new nation-state, the outcome of which 
determined the post-colonial nature of the latter. These processes deserve 
more research.
Third, what was also inherited from the colonial period was a strong tra-
dition of neo-patrimonial arrangements which had characterized most of the 
15 More research needs to be done to trace in greater detail the growth of the Indonesian admin-
istrative bureaucracy during the Japanse occupation and the Indonesian Revolution. 
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indirectly ruled parts of the colony. These were now rapidly appropriated by 
the administrative apparatus of the new nation-state. In his History of modern 
Indonesia, Vickers explicitly applied Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s Javacentric 
approach to Indonesian history during the twentieth century. As a conse-
quence developments outside Java received less attention while the fact that 
the Outer Islands took a different historical trajectory is by and large ignored. 
Burhan Magenda (1989) has demonstrated that in many parts of these Outer 
Islands conservative aristocratic elites managed to survive well into the 1970s 
within regional administrative bureaucracies. Consequently these bureaucra-
cies became ‘bastions of local aristocrats’ (Magenda 1989:892) and offered 
less space to the new nationalists. New research by Gerry van Klinken (2010) 
shows that, apart from these old aristocracies, in parts of Eastern Indonesia 
a new urban middle class, which was educated under the Dutch, firmly 
entrenched itself within the local bureaucracy.
Finally, the rapid expansion of the administrative apparatus also offered 
ample opportunities for people such as Tuan Kariumun to forge successful 
careers within the state. This had more to do with opportunism than with 
nationalism.
In sum, I fail to see how nationalists – as a supposedly homogeneous class – 
appropriated the administrative apparatus of the new nation-state, as Vickers 
argues. Instead, I suggest that the new nationalists were gradually absorbed 
into and socialized by the administrative habitus of the post-colonial state. In 
terms of social status this process was also identified by Geertz (1960:361) in 
Mojokuto, where, according to a young modernist santri, social hierarchy was 
as follows: at the top were government officials, followed by higher-ranked 
clerks, administrators and teachers, then petty clerks and ‘lower’ teachers, 
and only then followed by traders and landowners. Although class was 
becoming more important and upward mobility increased, proximity to the 
state was still decisive. Being a priyayi was what counted most.
Class did matter, but in a different way. Elsewhere (Schulte Nordholt 
2011) I have argued that the linear development from urbanization to mod-
ernization (Wertheim 1956) or modernity (Vickers 2005), leading to national-
ism, which features in many historical accounts of nationalism in Indonesia, 
obscures another important development. This concerns the rise of a substan-
tial indigenous (lower) middle class of approximately half a million people, 
the majority of whom were either employed by the colonial state or earned 
a living in the key sectors of the colonial economy. For them modernity was 
an attractive lifestyle, but this was not automatically connected with nation-
alism, because any affiliation with nationalism might endanger their career 
within the colonial state. Here we see a link between modernity and the state, 
but not necessarily with nationalism. My hypothesis is that the Revolution 
and Independence took these people by surprise, and that they were still pri-
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marily oriented towards the state and to a much lesser extent to the nation. 
Another hypothesis is that middle-class bureaucrats felt less comfortable 
with the elusive modernity propagated by Asrul Sani and his friends. Instead, 
they felt more at home with the call for national unity, rooted in the mythical 
past of Majapahit, in order to carve out a more authoritarian role for the state.
Gradually the political climate started to change. From 1952 onwards 
optimism about the future of the nation faced the grim realities of power 
struggles. Although identifying a specific point in time may be an arbitrary 
exercise, by 1956 the revolutionary honeymoon was definitively over. Dreams 
of a national cultural identity based on an open-minded modernity and pro-
jected into a promising future were overtaken by an alliance of state-oriented 
politicians and a post-colonial middle class which dominated the adminis-
trative bureaucracy. Or, to return to Greenblatt in the opening pages of this 
essay, mobility and a future-oriented modernity were defeated by rootedness 
and unity. This resulted eventually in a law of the rulers instead of the rule of 
law, causing the death of the Indonesian citizen.
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